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CRIMINOLOGY 
THE PERCEPTIONS OF JUVENILE JUDGES 
REGARDING ADOLESCENT 
DEVELOPMENT IN EVALUATING 
JUVENILE COMPETENCY 
COLLEEN M. BERRYESSA & JILLIAN REEVES* 
This analysis provides the first known in-depth qualitative inquiry into 
if and how juvenile court judges take the psycho-social immaturity and 
development of adolescents into consideration when making attributions of 
adjudicative competency of offenders in juvenile court.  Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with twenty-seven U.S. juvenile court judges, 
followed by grounded theory analysis.  Competency evaluations from 
psychologists and the juvenile’s age, history, awareness, and mental capacity 
influence judicial determinations of competency.  Although data show that 
understandings of adolescent development do play a large role in shaping 
judges’ understandings of juvenile behavior—particularly related to 
emotional control, irrational behavior, lack of maturity, and social 
susceptibility—most judges only connected these characteristics to juvenile 
offending.  Although cognizant that juveniles exhibit attributes that diminish 
competency-related abilities as part of their adolescent development, the 
majority of judges still stated that adolescent development is not important 
to them in assessing juvenile competency, potentially demonstrating a 
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cognitive disconnect on these issues.  These results indicate approaches to 
how judges might think about juvenile competency decisions (“building 
blocks” vs. “holistic” models) and the need for more direct education and 
training of judges on the role of adolescent development in competency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there have been vocal concerns about whether juvenile 
competency to stand trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings can be 
effectively measured by the Dusky two-prong test.1  According to this test, a 
juvenile must first understand the charges and legal proceedings that are 
mounted against him, and, second, he must also be able to assist his lawyer 
in his own defense.2  Regardless of jurisdiction, a judge evaluating a 
juvenile’s competency may examine the juvenile’s maturity.3  This may 
include an assessment of the juvenile’s ability to understand the long-term 
consequences of his actions and decisions in court, and his susceptibility to 
being excessively influenced by others, including his lawyer.4  Each of these 
competency-related abilities is dependent on the juvenile’s psycho-social 
maturity and developmental status and, particularly, changes in the juvenile’s 
cognitive abilities resulting from neurological changes in adolescence and 
early adulthood.5 
An appreciation of the extent to which a juvenile offender possesses 
competency-related abilities, especially by the juvenile judge ultimately 
making the competency determination, is necessary to ensure that the 
juvenile offender’s case can be adjudicated without coercion in a 
“developmentally appropriate way.”6  Therefore, understanding the ways in 
which juvenile judges consider research on adolescent development that is 
likely relevant to juvenile competency determinations is integral to ensuring 
fair and equitable outcomes for juvenile offenders.  Further, this 
understanding may assist states that are considering developing or modifying 
 
 1 Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading Through the 
Rhetoric and the Evidence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135, 138 (2008). 
 2 Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile 
Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 353, 357 (2001). 
 3 See Jennifer Mayer Cox et al., The Impact of Juveniles’ Ages and Levels of Psychosocial 
Maturity on Judges’ Opinions About Adjudicative Competence, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 21, 
22 (2012). 
 4 See generally Nancy L. Ryba et al., Juvenile Competence to Stand Trial Evaluations: A 
Survey of Current Practices and Test Usage Among Psychologists, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL. 499 
(2003) (presenting and analyzing elements assessed by psychologists in juvenile competency 
evaluations). 
 5 Id. at 500. 
 6 April R. Bradley et al., Juvenile Competency and Responsibility: Public Perceptions, 42 
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2411, 2412 (2012). 
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juvenile competency statutes, as well as help in the design of more tailored 
and effective educational programs for judges on these issues.7 
This Article, which is exploratory as the first of its kind in in-depth 
qualitative analysis, considers the attitudes of juvenile judges regarding 
competency to stand trial in relation to their understandings and perceptions 
of adolescent development and psycho-social maturity.  Presenting a 
qualitative analysis of twenty-seven interviews with a national sample of 
juvenile judges, we reveal the factors that judges find influential in 
determining juvenile competency,8 judges’ understandings of existing 
research on adolescent development,9 and judges’ views on the influence of 
age on competency and developmental-maturity-related abilities.10  We find 
that although data show that research on and understandings of adolescent 
development do play a large role in shaping judges’ understanding of juvenile 
behavior,11 the majority of judges only connected these characteristics to 
offending and did not suggest that adolescent development is important to 
them in assessing juvenile competency.12  Thus, the data presented indicate 
that many judges consider juvenile competency as largely unrelated to 
adolescent development and do not see a connection between the two.13  This 
research does have limitations, as it only portrays the views of twenty-seven 
self-selected individuals, sampling was not nationally representative, and it 
is unknown how the views presented here may actually impact juvenile 
competency determinations in practice.  As such, future studies, particularly 
those that use research designs with experimental components that may 
provide methodological triangulation on these issues, are warranted. 
Nonetheless, we argue that the fact that many judges in our study do not 
consider adolescent development as relevant to competency determinations, 
yet still indicate that juveniles exhibit attributes due to adolescent 
development that diminish competency-related abilities, shows a cognitive 
disconnect in judges’ perceptions on how adolescent development may affect 
competency.14  In response, in order to adjudicate juvenile cases in a 
 
 7 For discussions of how judge research can help juvenile justice policy, see generally 
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (3rd ed. 2007); Colleen M. Berryessa, 
Potential Impact of Research on Adolescent Development on Juvenile Judge Decision‐
making, 69 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 19 (2018). 
 8 See infra Section V.A. 
 9 See infra Section V.B. 
 10 See infra Section V.C & V.D. 
 11 See infra Section V.B. 
 12 See infra Section V.C. 
 13 See infra Section V.C. 
 14 See infra Section VI. 
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“developmentally appropriate way,” these results indicate the need for 
further research and more direct education and training of judges on the role 
of adolescent development in not only offending, but also in competency.15  
This analysis provides the first in-depth empirical qualitative inquiry on how 
juvenile judges perceive research on adolescent development and how it 
might affect the competency evaluation process. 
I. JUVENILE LEGAL COMPETENCY 
Competency to stand trial is a legal protection put forth to ensure that a 
defendant receives a fair trial.16  Standards of competency for criminal 
defendants were formalized in the landmark case Dusky v. United States, 
which established that competency to stand trial in criminal court involves 
two elements: (1) defendants must be able to assist their attorneys in 
mounting their defenses, and (2) defendants must fully understand court 
proceedings and the charges against them.17  This is contrasted with legal 
capacity, which is a person’s ability to make particular legal decisions such 
as entering a guilty plea or entering into a contract, and legal culpability, 
which is a person’s blameworthiness for a criminal act and to what degree he 
should be held responsible.18 
In criminal court, adult defendants are typically declared incompetent 
due to severe mental illness or an intellectual disability.19  In the juvenile 
court setting, competency to stand trial played no role until 1967.20  The legal 
rights of juveniles were not originally viewed as relevant within the juvenile 
court system given its rehabilitative purpose.21  The juvenile court system 
was a product of the Progressive Movement beginning in the late nineteenth 
century, which pushed for the creation of an independent legal system for 
 
 15 Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 2428. 
 16 See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 473 (2009). 
 17 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see also Dana Royce Baerger et al., 
Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjudicated and Petitioned Juvenile Defendants, 31 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 314, 314 (2003); Christina L. Riggs Romaine et al., Evaluation of 
Juvenile Competency to Proceed: Applying the Dusky Standard, 10 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 
PRAC. 1, 2 (2010); Ryba & Cooper, supra note 4, at 499. 
 18 See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 472–73. 
 19 See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of 
Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 334 
(2003). 
 20 See David R. Katner, Eliminating the Competency Presumption in Juvenile 
Delinquency Cases, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 410, 413–14 (2015). 
 21 Steinberg, supra note 16, at 474. 
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youth that was neither criminal nor adversarial in nature.22  The first juvenile 
court was established in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois, and by 1928, all but 
two states had a juvenile justice system.23  The initial purpose of the system 
was to rehabilitate juvenile offenders and protect children from 
maltreatment.24  Particularly, the creation of an independent system for 
juvenile offenders was built upon the principle that age and immaturity 
rendered juveniles less culpable compared to adults and, hence, capable of 
becoming good members of the community if offered suitable 
rehabilitation.25  Thus, treatment and protection of the child were considered 
the best responses to delinquent behavior, as opposed to traditional 
punishment.26 
The latter half of the twentieth century saw a gradual increase in legal 
protections for juveniles generally and their rights found within the adult 
court setting.  Initially, Dusky only applied to defendants tried in criminal 
court and did not extend to juvenile defendants in juvenile court.27  However, 
In re Gault established juvenile rights to a fair trial and due process, including 
a right to an attorney, the right to be protected against self-incrimination, the 
right to an appeal, and most importantly in this context, the fundamental right 
to competency to stand trial in juvenile court.28  The constitutional right of 
competency to stand trial and the potential extension of the Dusky standard 
suddenly became relevant to juveniles and a meaningful aspect of the 
juvenile justice adjudication process.29 
As competency to stand trial has become a significant component of 
juvenile justice, issues have been raised as to how the Dusky standards of 
competency should be practically applied to juveniles.  While competency 
requires that juveniles be able to understand the nature of their charges and 
 
 22 Id. at 461–62. 
 23 RANDALL G. SHELDEN, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 443 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 24 For discussions of the founding of the juvenile justice system, see generally Laura S. 
Abrams, Juvenile Justice at a Crossroads: Science, Evidence, and Twenty-First Century 
Reform, 87 SOC. SERV. REV. 725 (2013); Redding & Frost, supra note 2. 
 25 Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 141–44 (1997). 
 26 See Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications 
for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 772–73 (2015); Steinberg, supra note 16, at 461–
62. 
 27 Grisso et al., supra note 19, at 333–34. 
 28 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–42 (1967). 
 29 See Frank Fortunati et al., Juveniles and Competency to Stand Trial, 3 PSYCHIATRY 35, 
35–36 (2006); Ryba & Cooper, supra note 4, at 500; Scott & Grisso, supra note 25, at 141–
48; Twila A. Wingrove, Note, Is Immaturity a Legitimate Source of Incompetence to Avoid 
Standing Trial in Juvenile Court?, 86 NEB. L. REV. 488, 494–98 (2007). 
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assist in mounting a defense, states have been largely silent regarding 
whether Dusky standards should apply equally to defendants in juvenile 
court.30  Although several states have formally implemented statutes 
regarding competency to stand trial in juvenile court, around twenty states 
continue to process defendants in juvenile court without a well-defined 
statutory competency standard.31  Among the states that have adopted 
juvenile competency statutes, thirteen have adopted the Dusky standard 
almost verbatim, while eighteen states have adopted a version of the Dusky 
standard.32 
The addition of the Dusky standard to juvenile law has left many 
questions unanswered, particularly whether developmental immaturity 
should be integrated into competency standards.33  While both adults and 
juveniles can be mentally ill or disabled, one unique and pertinent feature of 
the juvenile population is that their adolescent development, as well as their 
psycho-social immaturity, has the potential to influence competency.34  A 
few states, such as Arkansas and Florida, have juvenile competency statute 
provisions related to developmental immaturity.35  However, despite these 
statutory provisions, juvenile judges have no real guidelines on how to 
consider the impact of developmental factors, such as age and maturity, on 
adolescent development in competency determinations, either apart from or 
alongside the Dusky standard.36  It is also unclear whether judges in these 
states actually consider adolescent development.37  Judges in other 
jurisdictions either are not tasked with weighing adolescent development in 
juvenile competency evaluations or may take such information into account 
at their own discretion.38 
 
 30 See Sanborn, supra note 1, at 139. 
 31 Id. at 140. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See Abrams, supra note 24, at 737; Eraka Bath & Joan Gerring, National Trends in 
Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial, 53 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 265, 
265–67 (2014). 
 34 See generally Scott & Grisso, supra note 25 (discussing psycho-social deficits related 
to juvenile capacity and competency). 
 35 See Kellie M. Johnson, Juvenile Competency Statutes: A Model for State Legislation, 
81 IND. L.J. 1067, 1085–86 (2006). 
 36 See Sanborn, supra note 1, at 138–49. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. at 140–43. 
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II. ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO 
COMPETENCY 
Research in the fields of neuroscience and psychology on the 
development of the human brain has produced new insights on and 
explanations of adolescent behavior in the last twenty years.  For adolescents, 
certain brain regions mature much later than others; for example, the limbic 
system, implicated in emotional responses to stimuli, matures quickly during 
the teen years.39  However, the frontal areas, which are responsible for skills 
associated with executive function, such as controlling inhibition, judgment, 
decision-making, and planning, do not finish development until an individual 
is around twenty-five years old.40 
This time difference in structural and functional maturation between the 
limbic system and frontal areas results in an “immaturity gap” between adults 
and juveniles.41  Although juveniles show similar reasoning ability and 
general intelligence levels as adults by the mid-teens, their decision-making 
abilities are significantly worse: compared to adults, juveniles have 
heightened responses to emotional stimuli and increased impulsivity.42  
Juveniles tend to take more risks than adults, in large part due to the 
heightened value placed on reward and high susceptibility to peer and 
authority influence.43  Planning abilities of juveniles tend to improve with 
age, suggesting that rash, impulsive behavior commonly seen in juveniles is 
the result of the developmental mismatch between the limbic system and 
frontal lobe.44 
 
 39 See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Suparna Choudhury, Development of the Adolescent 
Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 296, 301–07 (2006). For other reviews of studies addressing youth maturation of 
the limbic system, see generally Sarah-Jayne Blakemore et al., The Role of Puberty in the 
Developing Adolescent Brain, 31 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 926 (2010); Sarah B. Johnson et al., 
Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in 
Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216 (2009). 
 40 See Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 39, at 301–02. For other reviews of studies 
demonstrating the lack of youth maturation of the frontal lobes before age twenty-five, see 
generally Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917 (2009); 
Cohen et al., supra note 26; Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and 
the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Johnson et al., supra 
note 39; Steinberg, supra note 16. 
 41 See Aronson, supra note 40, at 922. 
 42 See Blakemore et al., supra note 39, at 927–31. For reviews of studies showing youth 
impulsivity and emotionality, see generally Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 39; Cohen 
et al., supra note 26. 
 43 See Lucy Foulkes & Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Is There Heightened Sensitivity to Social 
Reward in Adolescence?, 40 CURRENT OP. IN NEUROBIOLOGY 81 (2016). 
 44 See Abrams, supra note 24, at 737–44; Steinberg, supra note 16, at 466. 
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In the last twenty years, there has been at least a partial return to the 
rehabilitative goal of juvenile court, due in large part to an increase in 
acceptance of research on adolescent development.45  Criminality in youth is 
thought to be a reflection of impulsivity, poor decision-making, and inability 
to think about long-term consequences.46  Juveniles make riskier decisions 
and think less about consequences, which may lead to offending.47  Inhibition 
control, short-term memory, and processing speed are also stunted during 
adolescence, which can lead to anti-social behavior fueled by reward and 
peer influence.48  Therefore, recent research empirically confirms the 
principles upon which the juvenile justice system was originally built: that 
age and inexperience make juveniles different from adults and accordingly 
less culpable.49  The use of research on adolescent development in major 
Supreme Court cases such as Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and 
Miller v. Alabama has signaled a legal shift toward acknowledging the 
differences between juveniles and adults in psycho-social maturity, and these 
cases have removed the most retributive punishments: the death penalty and 
life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.50 
Yet, the same behaviors and tendencies associated with the “immaturity 
gap”51 that have signaled a legal change in understanding juvenile culpability 
and punishment have implications for juvenile competency as well.52  
Particularly, maturity of judgment in legal contexts is significantly affected 
by adolescent development.53  Although there might not be substantial 
differences between the cognitive abilities of “average” adolescents and 
adults, those cognitive abilities do not specifically help youth with 
 
 45 See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 479. 
 46 Alison S. Burke, Under Construction: Brain Formation, Culpability, and the Criminal 
Justice System, 34 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 381, 382–83 (2011). 
 47 See Claire Bryan-Hancock & Sharon Casey, Young People and the Justice System: 
Consideration of Maturity in Criminal Responsibility, 18 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 69, 73 
(2011). For reviews of studies showing youth risk-taking, see generally Margo Gardner & 
Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision 
Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 625 (2005). 
 48 See Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 39, at 297–307; Johnson et al., supra note 39, 
at 218. 
 49 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 25, at 172–76. 
 50 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also Cohen et al., supra note 26, at 773–
75. 
 51 Aronson, supra note 40, at 922. 
 52 See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 473–76. 
 53 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: 
Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1996). 
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competency-related behaviors for trial.54  For example, a juvenile’s ability to 
understand the long-term consequences of his actions and decisions in court; 
his ability to avoid being unduly influenced by others including his lawyer 
and the judge; the maturity of his decision-making related to waiving legal 
rights or taking pleas; and his ability to understand legal jargon, the legal 
process, the charges against him, and the weight of legal decisions are all 
potentially impaired by the adolescent immaturity gap.55  Each of these 
competency-related capacities depends on the juvenile’s current 
developmental status and cognitive abilities, which in turn are directly 
influenced by the psychological and brain changes that take place in 
adolescence and early adulthood.56  These capacities, as well as knowledge 
of trials and legal concepts, appear to be lacking for a huge number of 
adolescents across age groups and particularly for children under sixteen.57 
A few studies have used “competency screening” measures to assess the 
abilities of juveniles, but these often fail to consider maturity and psycho-
social abilities.58  The use of the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-
Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) as a proxy for competency has shown 
mixed results when used in juvenile populations.59  The MacCAT-CA has 
three subcategories thought to measure cognitive aspects of competency: 
Understanding (the ability to understand the law); Reasoning (the ability to 
reason in legal proceedings and with respect to legal decisions); and 
 
 54 See id. at 334–36. 
 55 See id. at 335. 
 56 See Ryba et al., supra note 4, at 500. 
 57 See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in 
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 
742–45 (2000). For discussions on the lack of legal capacities of youth, see generally Michele 
Peterson-Badali et al., Young Children’s Legal Knowledge and Reasoning Ability, 39 CAN. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 145 (1997); Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 53. 
 58 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical 
Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992) [hereinafter Bonnie, A Theoretical 
Reformulation]; Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky 
and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope]; 
Deborah K. Cooper, Juveniles’ Understanding of Trial‐Related Information: Are They 
Competent Defendants?, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 167 (1997). 
 59 Compare Molly S. Jacobs et al., Competence-Related Abilities and Psychiatric 
Symptoms: An Analysis of the Underlying Structure and Correlates of the MacCAT-CA and 
the BPRS, 32 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 67 (2008) (showing validation of instrument), with 
Nancy R. Panza & Theresa Fraser, Effects of Age, Adaptive Behavior, and Cognitive Abilities 
on Competence-Related Abilities in Children and Adolescents, 15 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 
PRAC. 138 (2015) (showing results contrary to expected clustering of abilities as measured by 
instrument). 
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Appreciation (the ability to appreciate legal consequences).60  Although 
several studies have shown little difference in juvenile and adult competency 
scores using the MacCAT-CA, some research has found that juveniles 
between ten and fifteen years old are often incompetent according to this 
measure.61  Children between nine and twelve years old who have been 
administered the MacCAT-CA are often significantly more compromised 
than older adolescents, although the MacCAT-CA may not be able to 
effectively measure the long-term consequences of Understanding and 
Appreciation abilities for older juveniles.62  Indeed, older adolescents have 
shown they cannot weigh long-term consequences, which is exemplified by 
their readiness to accept “bad” plea bargains for the sole purpose of ending a 
case.63 
Ultimately, research has indicated that juveniles are generally able to 
understand the words said in court proceedings, but, across all ages, are often 
unable to properly interpret their legal effect; adolescents possess everyday 
“competency,” but the inability to be aware of the consequences of decisions 
and think long-term are signs that psycho-social development can impair 
abilities necessary for full adjudicative competency.64  Accordingly, whether 
a juvenile is ruled competent while exhibiting these shortcomings has 
immense legal significance and potential repercussions and can lead to 
adjudication involving coercion.65  The Dusky standard, as extended to 
juvenile proceedings in In re Gault, holds that individuals must be competent 
to stand trial in order for the proceedings to be fair.66  Yet the inability to help 
oneself or one’s defense lawyer, susceptibility to undue influence by one’s 
lawyer, and inability to understand court proceedings handicap the offender 
 
 60 Janet I. Warren et al., Correlates of Adjudicative Competence Among Psychiatrically 
Impaired Juveniles, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 299, 301 (2003). 
 61 For studies showing significant differences between juveniles and adults according to 
this measure, see Eraka Bath et al., Correlates of Competency to Stand Trial Among Youths 
Admitted to a Juvenile Mental Health Court, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 329 (2015); 
Darla M.R. Burnett et al., Adjudicative Competency in a Juvenile Population, 31 CRIM. JUST. 
& BEHAV. 438 (2004); Allison D. Redlich et al., Pre‐adjudicative and Adjudicative 
Competence in Juveniles and Young Adults, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393 (2003). For an example 
of a study showing similar competency levels between adults and juveniles, see Jodi L. Viljoen 
et al., Adjudicative Competence and Comprehension of Miranda Rights in Adolescent 
Defendants: A Comparison of Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1 (2007). 
 62 Warren et al., supra note 60, at 300–04. 
 63 Philip C. O’Donnell & Bruce Gross, Developmental Incompetence to Stand Trial in 
Juvenile Courts, 57 J. FORENSIC SCI. 989, 990 (2012). 
 64 See id. at 990–93. 
 65 Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 2412. 
 66 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
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and increase the likelihood of an unfair legal outcome.67  If a juvenile lacks 
the ability to satisfy either or both of the Dusky competency standards due to 
developmental immaturity, the juvenile’s decisions over the course of the 
trial could be detrimental to his future.68  Yet, as discussed above, 
competency screening measures and judicial determinations of competency 
have not to date actively and effectively taken psycho-social maturity into 
account to ensure fair and equitable outcomes for juveniles.69 
III. JUVENILE JUDGES AND DETERMINING JUVENILE COMPETENCY 
Juvenile judges, using evidence, their own opinions, and competency 
evaluations from psychologists or clinicians, are the individuals who make 
the ultimate rulings whether or not juveniles are competent to stand trial.70  
When looking at competency evaluations, juvenile judges tend to put 
significant weight on the opinions of a clinician or psychologist who 
conducts a competency evaluation.71  Age sometimes increases a judge’s 
likelihood of declaring incompetence, with younger juveniles being more 
likely to be ruled incompetent, although results are inconsistent.72  For 
example, within a sample of Chicago juvenile offenders, roughly 27% of 
incompetent juveniles were less than twelve years old, compared to only 11% 
of competent juveniles.73  Similarly, in a study of juvenile offenders in Los 
Angeles, juveniles younger than fifteen years old were more likely to be ruled 
incompetent than older juveniles.74  Evidence of a mental health issue, such 
as a psychiatric diagnosis, has also been known to be influential to juvenile 
judges’ competency decisions.75 
Yet there is far less evidence about the influence of developmental 
maturity on juvenile judges’ competency decisions.  A survey of juvenile 
judges and defense attorneys from seven states showed roughly 75% of 
judges did not believe that a youth’s developmental immaturity significantly 
affected competency.76  Conversely, Cox et al., utilizing experimental 
 
 67 See Bath & Gerring, supra note 33, at 265–67. 
 68 See id. at 266–68. 
 69 See supra Section I. 
 70 See Sanborn, supra note 1, at 192. 
 71 Viljoen et al., supra note 61, at 115–17. 
 72 Cox et al., supra note 3, at 24–25. 
 73 Baerger et al., supra note 17, at 316–18. 
 74 See Bath et al., supra note 61, at 333–35. 
 75 See Jodi L. Viljoen & Twila Wingrove, Adjudicative Competence in Adolescent 
Defendants: Judges’ and Defense Attorneys’ Views of Legal Standards for Adolescents in 
Juvenile and Criminal Court, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 204, 216–19 (2007). 
 76 Id. at 218–19. 
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vignettes, found that judges considered juvenile psycho-social maturity to be 
significant to judicial determinations of competency for adolescents between 
twelve and seventeen years of age.77  Thus, the limited evidence that exists 
on how judges prioritize adolescent development in competency decisions 
uses quantitative research designs and is conflicting. 
Marked changes have occurred in the last twenty years as the justice 
system, including the Supreme Court, has used research on adolescent 
development in rulings to recognize key differences in psycho-social 
development between juveniles and adults.78  However, judges’ attitudes may 
affect the ways in which they view and rule upon juvenile competency, which 
may correspondingly shape caselaw.79  Juvenile judges have been recognized 
as the main individuals who dictate the philosophy of the juvenile justice 
system.80  A juvenile judge is responsible for ensuring that the court treats 
juveniles fairly and has the means to offer effective services and treatment to 
juveniles.81  Therefore, juvenile judges’ appreciation of the role of adolescent 
development in making competency determinations is both practically and 
philosophically important. 
Overall, it remains unclear how adolescent development may fit into 
competency determinations for judges.82  There is no national standard for 
juvenile competency, nor unanimity about the influence of developmental 
immaturity on juvenile competency amongst juvenile judges.83  Utilizing 
semi-structured interviews with twenty-seven juvenile judges from across the 
U.S. and grounded theory methods, this study examines juvenile judges’ 
perceptions of the factors that affect juvenile competency to stand trial, 
particularly their understandings and perceptions of adolescent development 
and psycho-social maturity.84  Specifically, we were interested in 
determining if, how, and why judges take psycho-social immaturity into 
consideration when making attributions about juveniles’ adjudicative 
competency, whether or not judges’ attitudes toward adolescent development 
and competency related to one another, if judges had been trained on these 
 
 77 Cox et al., supra note 3, at 24–26. 
 78 See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Cohen et al., supra note 26, at 773–75. 
 79 Viljoen & Wingrove, supra note 75, at 206. 
 80 See Leonard P. Edwards, The Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 
25, 25–29 (1992). 
 81 See id. 
 82 See Viljoen & Wingrove, supra note 75, at 220–26. 
 83 Amanda NeMoyer et al., Attorney Perspectives on Juvenile and Adult Clients’ 
Competence to Plead Guilty, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 171, 172 (2018); Ryba et al., 
supra note 4, at 500. 
 84 See infra Section V. 
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issues, and if such attitudes might negatively impact the adjudication of cases 
in juvenile court.85 
IV. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This research uses qualitative methodology, which allows for complex 
descriptions, detailed understandings and contextualization of the 
experiences being studied, and a grounded theory approach.86  Ultimately, 
our data consist of semi-structured interviews with twenty-seven juvenile 
court judges from sixteen different states, collected from January 2018 to 
March 2018.  This study has been approved by the authors’ institutional 
review boards (IRBs). 
A. PARTICIPANT SELECTION 
Purposeful random sampling was used for this research.87  The 
purposeful sample for this study is a random selection of judges from across 
the U.S. who sit on juvenile courts and hear juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.  Only juvenile judges whose mailing addresses were publicly 
available were accessible for study selection, resulting in targeting only 
thirty-nine of the fifty states.  Further, no previous time on the bench, 
experience with competency, or previous knowledge of adolescent 
development, neuroscience, or psychology, was required of judges to 
participate in the study. 
Purposeful sampling, which allows for the methodical selection of 
participants who can provide valuable information relevant to the study’s 
focus, is a commonly used theoretical sampling technique that provides cases 
to deeply study the research questions and allow for the emergence of 
grounded theory.88  While random sampling is often used to provide 
representativeness and generalizability to a sample and research questions,89 
neither were goals of this research, and this study instead used purposeful 
random sampling, rather than purposeful sampling, for two main reasons. 
 
 85 See infra Section V. 
 86 For descriptions of qualitative methodologies, see generally JOSEPH A. MAXWELL, 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN: AN INTERACTIVE APPROACH (3d ed. 2013); SHARON M. 
RAVITCH & NICOLE C. MITTENFELNER CARL, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: BRIDGING THE 
CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL, AND METHODOLOGICAL (2016); ANSELM L. STRAUSS & JULIET M. 
CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1990). 
 87 See generally MAXWELL, supra note 86, at 96–98. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See generally RAVITCH & CARL, supra note 86 (describing sampling techniques for 
qualitative research). 
2020] THE PERCEPTIONS OF JUVENILE JUDGES 565 
First, the intent of this research was not to focus on the views of judges 
in one particular state because juvenile competency is a national issue that 
affects all juvenile judges in all jurisdictions.90  Therefore, we believed our 
research questions were relevant to judges from across the United States, and 
a deep, emergent understanding of these issues, which is the goal of grounded 
theory research,91 required participants from several states.  Since we chose 
to sample juvenile judges from the across the United States, purposeful 
random sampling was used because it would be impossible to contact every 
juvenile judge in the country.  There are thousands of judges that review 
thousands of cases in juvenile courts across states, meaning that every judge 
who fit the selection criteria could not be contacted or interviewed.92  
Therefore, as described below, we chose to randomly select counties and 
fifteen judges from those counties in order to provide a methodical sampling 
technique for each state that would provide a feasible sampling strategy.  
Second, although judges’ jurisdictions did not appear to affect their views in 
this research, we also wanted to allow for data collection from many 
jurisdictions in order to allow for and record those differences in views by 
jurisdiction if present.93 
The initial goal for the research sample was between twenty and thirty 
judges, the model size for grounded theory to reach theoretical saturation.94  
The selection of judges for this research occurred in two stages.  First, 
juvenile judges in the state of Georgia were targeted.  These interviews 
served as a pilot for the interview protocol, and a random selection of fifteen 
judges were sent an interview request via U.S. mail.  Juvenile judges in 
Georgia were targeted at this stage because Georgia has a Council of Juvenile 
Court Judges that makes the mailing addresses of all juvenile judges in the 
state available online in one location.95  Once those judges were contacted 
and some of them interviewed, the protocol was slightly amended for clarity 
(but no changes to content), and the second stage of selection was 
undertaken. 
 
 90 See Sanborn, supra note 1, at 138–49. 
 91 See generally STRAUSS & CORBIN, supra note 86 (describing the purposes of grounded 
theory methodology). 
 92 For juvenile court statistics, see NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT 
STATISTICS (2016), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/njcda/pdf/jcs2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7
DLV-3KZZ]. 
 93 See supra Section IV.E. 
 94 Mark Mason, Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative Interviews, 
11 FORUM: QUALITATIVE SOC. RES. 4 (2010). 
 95 Judges were contacted via their addresses available at https://georgiacourts.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/Juvenile-Court-Judges-by-County_Web-Index-1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8S4Z-5SDE]. 
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Second, a random selection of juvenile judges in thirty-eight other states 
were targeted.  Eleven states (Delaware, Alaska, Kentucky, Maine, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Vermont) and the District of Columbia were omitted from the 
sampling because there was either no public posting of these states’ juvenile 
judges or the mailing addresses of posted judges were not publicly available.  
A random sample of seven counties from each of the remaining thirty-eight 
states was tabulated; then, a random sample of fifteen juvenile judges from 
across those seven counties for each state was collected from online court 
websites.  Judges were contacted via U.S. mail to request participation.  In 
total, 570 judges were targeted from these remaining thirty-eight states. 
Combined with the fifteen judges targeted from Georgia, this study 
targeted 585 judges from thirty-nine states by mail.  This number of judges 
(585) was targeted in order to obtain a sample of twenty to thirty judges as a 
model sample size for this grounded theory study.  Previous research 
interviewing state court judges has shown that the interview request response 
rate for judges is traditionally around 5%,96 meaning that contacting 585 
judges was likely necessary to secure the participation of between twenty to 
thirty judges.  In all, twenty-seven of the 585 judges contacted agreed to 
participate, resulting in a 5% response rate. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Sources of data include semi-structured interviews with judges fitting 
the selection criteria above.  The courthouse mailing addresses of targeted 
judges (N=585), which are publicly available online, were collected, and 
judges were contacted via U.S. mail with interview requests.  Each interview 
request included a letter with information on the study and contact 
information for the first author, including email address and phone number.  
Interviews were scheduled, conducted via telephone, audio-recorded, and 
transcribed.  Verbal consent from participants was also gathered before 
beginning the interviews. 
 
 96 For examples of studies with judicial response rates of around 5%, see Colleen M. 
Berryessa, Brief Report: Judicial Attitudes Regarding the Sentencing of Offenders with High 
Functioning Autism, 46 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORDERS 2770 (2016) [hereinafter Berryessa, 
Sentencing of Offenders]; Colleen M. Berryessa, Judges’ Views on Evidence of Genetic 
Contributions to Mental Disorders in Court, 27 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 586 
(2016) [hereinafter Berryessa, Genetic Contributions]; Colleen M. Berryessa, Judicial 
Perceptions of Media Portrayals of Offenders with High Functioning Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders, 3 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOC. 46 (2014) [hereinafter Berryessa, Portrayals of 
Offenders]; Colleen M. Berryessa, Judiciary Views on Criminal Behaviour and Intention of 
Offenders with High-Functioning Autism, 5 J. INTELL. DISABILITIES & OFFENDING BEHAV. 97 
(2014) [hereinafter Berryessa, Intention of Offenders]. 
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C. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Interviews lasted on average thirty-two minutes and ranged in length 
from thirteen minutes to one hour and three minutes.97  They included areas 
of questioning, noted below, that allow for the development of grounded 
theory.98  There was one interviewer, Dr. Colleen Berryessa, who completed 
all twenty-seven interviews.  She was trained via cognitive pretesting, which 
involves testing the interview instrument with colleagues by asking them to 
“think aloud” about each interview question to make sure questions are being 
interpreted as intended.99  She was also trained in dialogic engagement, 
which involves discussing different points of view on the interview process 
and protocol with experts in the current methodology and substantive topics 
of study in order to better attune the interview protocol and process to the 
research population and study goals.100 
Judges were asked several “opinion and values” questions so that they 
could describe their thoughts about factors that they may consider in 
determining or evaluating juvenile competency, including things most 
important in determining adjudicative competency for juveniles, thoughts on 
reports and opinions of psychologists in these contexts, and other related 
questions.  “Knowledge” questions were asked to seek an understanding of 
judges’ knowledge of research regarding how juveniles behaviorally, 
socially, and emotionally develop during adolescence.  “Experience and 
behavior” questions were asked to explore past experiences with research 
related to adolescent development and training on such issues. 
In addition to open-ended prompts, a series of questions from Bradley 
et al.101 (some of which are not presented here due to space constraints), were 
asked to assess judges’ opinions on the influence of age on competency-
related abilities, as well as when full brain development occurs; judges were 
asked to provide an age or age range as a response to each of these 
questions.102  Finally, “background and demographic” questions were asked 
 
 97 Further detail as to interview protocol is available upon request. 
 98 See generally MICHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH & EVALUATION 
METHODS: INTEGRATING THEORY AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 2015) (discussing of areas of 
questioning that allow for the development of grounded theory in interview-based qualitative 
methodology). 
 99 See Kristin L. K. Koskey, Using the Cognitive Pretesting Method to Gain Insight Into 
Participants’ Experiences: An Illustration and Methodological Reflection, 15 INT’L J. 
QUALITATIVE METHODS 1, 1 (2016). 
 100 See Trena M. Paulus et al., Extending the Conversation: Qualitative Research as 
Dialogic Collaborative Process, 13 QUALITATIVE REP. 226, 226–27 (2008). 
 101 Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 2419. 
 102 See infra Table I. 
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to identify and capture judges’ basic demographics that could have 
influenced their perceptions as they relate to the current research. 
 
Table 1. Selected questions asked to assess judges’ opinions on the 
age of full brain development and the influence of age on 
competency-related abilities from Bradley et al. 
At what age do you think the human brain fully developed? 
At what age is a person old enough . . .  
a. to understand court proceedings and utilize an attorney in his/her own 
defense? 
b. to weight long-term consequences of trial such as considering plea 
bargains? 
c. to avoid being unduly influenced by authority figures (such as attorneys)? 
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
A grounded theory approach was used to analyze the data.103 Dedoose 
software was used to organize, store, and code the data in a multi-step 
process.  First, open coding was used, which is the initial process of 
iteratively organizing data into preliminary themes observed in the data, after 
twelve interviews were conducted.104  Next, following full data collection, 
axial coding was used, described by Strauss and Corbin as the process of 
“reassembling data that were fractured during open coding.”105  During this 
stage, themes established during open coding were grouped into categories 
by examining the data to determine how categories are related.106  Finally, 
selective coding was used, in which the main theoretical patterns were 
developed by comparing and interpreting categories of data to illuminate the 
ways in which categories from axial coding are connected, as related to the 
study’s research focus.107 
Further, interrater reliability of the coding scheme was calculated during 
the coding process to validate the coding scheme.  Interrater reliability 
involves the coding of the data by multiple individuals during data analysis 
 
 103 See generally STRAUSS & CORBIN, supra note 86 (reviewing the step-by-step analysis 
and coding process of grounded theory methodology). 
 104 See id. at 62. 
 105 ANSELM L. STRAUSS & JULIET M. CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: 
GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 124 (1998). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See STRAUSS & CORBIN, supra note 105, at 116–18. 
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and helps to establish the rigor of a qualitative study’s coding scheme.108 
Three independent co-coders coded and analyzed a random sample of 
nineteen transcripts to calculate the interrater reliability of the coding 
scheme.  Initial interrater reliability was confirmed (Cohen k=0.72), and 
inconsistencies were remedied through discussion between co-coders.  Slight 
changes were made to data in this piece for readability, but none altered the 
essences of the presented quotations. 
E. DEMOGRAPHICS 
Basic demographics of the twenty-seven interviewed juvenile judges 
can be found in Table 2.  Although social demographic categories (e.g., 
gender, age, etc.) have been found to potentially influence judges’ views and 
philosophies,109 none of the demographics collected in this study, including 
the particular states in which judges served, appeared to be connected to or 
influence any specific themes observed in the data related to this study’s 
research focus.  Judges were from sixteen different states.  All judges handled 


















 108 Rosaline S. Barbour, Checklists for Improving Rigour in Qualitative Research: A Case 
of the Tail Wagging the Dog?, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 1115, 1116 (2001). 
 109 See CASSIE C. SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND 
JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT 105–21 (2d ed. 2009); Brian D. Johnson, The Multilevel Context of 
Criminal Sentencing: Integrating Judge‐and County‐Level Influences, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 259, 
280 (2006). 
 110 Other demographics of note not indicated here are also available upon request. 
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 Female 10 judges 
(37.04%) 
 Male 17 judges 
(62.96%) 
 
Average Age 58.96 years  
(SD = 8.37) 
 



































Cases Per Day 
22.50 years  
(SD = 32.53) 
 
Average Years as a 
Judge 
12.54 years  
(SD = 8.02) 
 
Average Years as a 
Juvenile Judge 
11.36 years  
(SD = 8.32) 
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V. RESULTS 
Based on the findings, we present five main themes, further divided into 
sub-themes, that speak to the nuances of the perceptions of juvenile judges 
on adolescent development in relation to their determinations of 
competency.111  The first main theme focuses on the perceptions of juvenile 
judges on the range and importance of factors that they consider in 
determining juvenile competency (A. Factors that Influence the 
Determination of Juvenile Competency).112  The second overarching theme 
focuses on judges’ understandings of existing research on adolescent 
development and how they believe it generally affects juvenile behavior (B. 
Perceptions of How Adolescent Development Influences Juvenile 
Behavior).113  The third main theme examines if, how, and why judges 
consider adolescent development as important in determining juvenile 
competency (C. Judges’ Application of Adolescent Development to Juvenile 
Competency).114  The fourth general theme discusses a series of questions 
judges were asked concerning at what age juveniles develop competency-
related abilities (D. Opinions on Age of Competency-Related Abilities).115  
The final theme examines judges’ previous training on and exposure to 
adolescent development research in legal contexts, as well as their levels of 
knowledge on and hope for future training on these issues (E. Training on 
Adolescent Development and Psycho-social Maturity).116 
A. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE DETERMINATION OF 
JUVENILE COMPETENCY 
1. Age 
Judges reported taking age into account when evaluating a juvenile’s 
competency, but many did not consider it the most important factor in their 
determinations.  Emphasis was placed on responding to the juvenile in what 
the judges considered to be an age-appropriate manner, particularly if the 
juvenile is thirteen years old or younger.  Several judges commented that 
young children might be unable to meet the standards of competency based 
on cognition and context.  Judge 7 linked age to immaturity: “There are some 
children that may come before the court at very early ages because there are 
 
 111 See infra Sections V.A.–V.E. 
 112 See infra Section V.A. 
 113 See infra Section V.B. 
 114 See infra Section V.C. 
 115 See infra Section V.D. 
 116 See infra Section V.E. 
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some acute issue[s] going on, but because of their age, they may well be 
deemed not competent to stand trial just because of their age.”117  Further, 
most judges believed that the restoration of youth competency (which 
includes meetings and exercises with a restoration counselor, as well as 
waiting a period of time in order for a youth to become competent enough to 
stand trial) for young children was unnecessary and something that judges 
sought to avoid.  As Judge 2 explained, “If you’re 13 years old and you do 
something, why do I want to put you somewhere for a year or two to get you 
competent so I can get you back in and then sentence you? That works against 
solving the problem.”118 
2. Awareness 
Judges emphasized awareness as important to their considerations of 
juvenile competency.  “Awareness” was described as behaviors that 
demonstrate to a judge a juvenile’s ability to meet the standards of 
competency.  As such, awareness was considered necessary by judges 
because “if your goal is to punish someone, then you want to be sure they 
understand, you know, what it is that is going on and [ . . . ] why they’re being 
punished.”119  Judge 22 explained what he looked for when assessing 
awareness: 
One is, does the child understand who he is working with? As to an attorney and a judge 
and so forth. And two, is he able to understand that whatever brought him into court 
could lead to consequences for him or her? And if he doesn’t know who he’s working 
with or that there are consequences to things happening in court, I guess beyond those 
two, we have to take another approach.120 
In describing awareness, judges mentioned the importance of certain 
features and behaviors of a juvenile such as a juvenile’s demeanor in the 
courtroom and during interviews and conversations with judges.  Behavioral 
cues, judges noted, also bear on juvenile competency, as they are often 
indicative of how well a juvenile understands court proceedings and can 
assist his defense lawyer.  Several judges also mentioned paying attention to 
statements made by juveniles about why they had committed criminal acts 
and the responses that juveniles give when asked awareness-related questions 
by psychologists during competency evaluations.  Finally, a juvenile’s 
interactions with his attorney were also described to be a key measure of 
juvenile “awareness.”  Judge 12 gave an example of a tell-tale statement: 
 
 117 Judge 7. 
 118 Judge 2. 
 119 Judge 19. 
 120 Judge 22. 
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In the courtroom, you’ll see the child say, ‘Well, I know I did this,’ and the attorney 
can’t stop them, or ‘I know I’m a bad kid.’ And so, we wind up having statements that 
show that they don’t understand their rights or that there’s a process and that process 
could be beneficial to the outcome of their situation.121 
3. Evidence and History 
The “narratives” of juveniles were highlighted as important for judges 
in determining competency for the purposes of contextualizing them and 
their behavior.  Judges acknowledged the possible influences of a juvenile’s 
background and experiences with neglect, abuse, and maltreatment that may 
affect why a juvenile is in court.  For example, one judge stated that she liked 
to take background into account “because part of the decision-making for me 
is always, where’s that child going to be for the next period of time? And so, 
I certainly don’t want to send them to a place that might be detrimental to 
their well-being.”122 
Judges vocalized an interest in obtaining a “fuller picture” of the 
juvenile in competency determinations, including a juvenile’s background, 
particularly the psychological and social context in which he is situated.  
Judges discussed some of the ways in which they are able to obtain this 
“fuller picture,” such as accessing school records and speaking to parents, 
case officers, psychologists, and the adolescent’s school to learn about 
behavior outside of the courtroom.  The importance of understanding this 
background was noted by Judge 4, who explained: 
You have a better understanding and perspective on how to handle delinquency cases 
because a lot of times, you know, children make bad decisions. A lot of times, it’s 
because of their environment or the way they were brought up or what’s going on in 
the home and a lot of times that can be changed or affected when they’re very young. 
But if it’s not caught, then a lot of times these are the same kids that [grow up to] be 
what we would call a delinquent.123 
4. Mental Capacity 
The mental capacity of juveniles came up frequently as important pieces 
of evidence in competency determinations.  Capacity, in this context, speaks 
to the youth’s legal capacity to make particular legal decisions, such as 
entering a guilty plea or entering into a contract; such capacity can be affected 
by mental disorder, intellectual disability, or other factors.124 
 
 121 Judge 12. 
 122 Judge 20. 
 123 Judge 4. 
 124 Steinberg, supra note 16, at 472–73. 
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Judges particularly took capacity as it relates to mental health into 
consideration, often being “particularly concerned about . . . [the] 
competency of children with special needs.”125  Many judges stated that a 
juvenile’s mental ability influenced or even often determined whether a judge 
would decide to move forward with adjudication; particularly intellectual 
disability, meaning an IQ below 70, was seen as compelling evidence to 
reject competency.  If a child does not have appropriate mental capacity, then 
he or she will not be able to understand court proceedings, assist his or her 
attorneys, or communicate effectively, all key elements of competency.  
Judge 20 gave an example of a previous case in which a defense lawyer did 
not believe his older juvenile client was competent, but the juvenile was 
discovered to have high-functioning autism during the competency 
evaluation.  Interestingly, that diagnosis was considered, but ultimately the 
child was ruled competent, as the judge believed that the diagnosis did not 
affect the child’s intellectual capacity.  Judge 20 stated that such a diagnosis 
helped both the judge and the lawyer to understand the juvenile’s behavior 
and tailor the court proceedings to his social and affective deficits. 
5. Evaluations 
Information collected and reported by psychologists in evaluations was 
reported by many judges to be most important in competency decisions.  In 
deciding how best to handle the juveniles that come before them, judges 
frequently use the reports to get a sense of whether competency may be a 
potential issue.  Evaluations were also viewed as a means through which 
judges could get information while still protecting the child.  Judges were 
aware of the potential for error and the intimidating effect of trying to 
consider competency without the evaluations. 
The evidence found within these evaluations was considered essential 
for a subset of judges, who acknowledged that they lacked the “expertise and 
the knowledge to evaluate a child’s or a person’s ability to understand.”126  
Yet, for many, evaluations are only one of many pieces of evidence taken 
into account when determining juvenile competency.  A few judges asserted 
that “no one area is going to be sufficient all unto itself in my opinion.”127  
Particularly, trust in the results of an evaluation was important to the weight 
a judge would give these evaluations.  Judges had different expectations for 
the accuracy and contents of these reports, although many repeatedly 
mentioned length and amount of detail as greatly important.  Some judges 
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 126 Judge 14. 
 127 Judge 3. 
2020] THE PERCEPTIONS OF JUVENILE JUDGES 575 
typically receive shorter reports, but most who placed high value on 
evaluations expected longer, more in-depth reports.  These judges wanted to 
see the evaluators describe their methods and provide their sources of 
information about the child.  Clarity in results was also a common desire of 
judges, along with observations, justifications of results, and for some judges, 
evaluators’ recommendations for treatment. 
Ultimately, the performance of an evaluator is incredibly important to 
juvenile judges, and some judges appeared suspicious of the methods used 
by evaluators and the results of evaluations in their jurisdictions.  As one 
judge stated, “Sometimes the evaluation is only as good as those who are 
arranging it, providing the information, and their understanding of it.”128  
Judges who expressed a high amount of trust in reports stated that they only 
trust these reports at the level they do because they are most often being 
performed by evaluators with whom they have worked for a significant 
period of time.  Judge 15 expressed that “there are some clinicians I probably 
have a little bit higher level of confidence in than others, partly because of 
how much time I’ve spent with them.”129 
B. PERCEPTIONS OF HOW ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 
INFLUENCES JUVENILE BEHAVIOR 
1. Increased Social Susceptibility 
Judges stressed that the continuing psychological and neurological 
development of the juvenile brain makes juveniles more susceptible to the 
influence of their peers and authority figures compared to adults.  
Particularly, judges considered peer pressure to be a partial explanation of 
offending behavior.  Judges generally regarded many of the juveniles that 
come before them not as “criminals,” but young people who have fallen prey 
to bad influence and would not have otherwise offended if not for their peers.  
Judge 23 offered an example: 
This juvenile, by himself alone would never have done this, but this group of kids in 
this particular situation, he got caught along, went along with what everyone else was 
doing, was part of it and then something horrible happened. So, I think it has a big 
effect on how juvenile offenders and how they— why they do the things that they do. 
A good example would be . . . kids tearing stuff up, doing things that are just totally 
illogical. Usually, many times it’s in a group.130 
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The influence of research on the social susceptibility of juveniles 
manifested in judges taking a more sympathetic and understanding view of 
juveniles and their behavior.  Rather than taking a punitive approach, Judge 
2 suggested that the more judges understand social susceptibility, “the more 
we know that we shouldn’t hold [juveniles] to the same standard, especially 
if there’s a group of people.”131 
2. Irrational Behavior and Immaturity 
Judges also indicated a belief that the rebellious and greater risk-taking 
behaviors exhibited by juveniles are the result of adolescent development.  
Judges consistently repeated scientific findings showing that juveniles are 
more likely to take risks due to lack of impulse control and incomplete frontal 
lobe development, which is knowledge they have procured from previous 
trainings.  They stated that they often assess how the brain could increase 
irrationality in adolescent behavior.  Judge 6 explained that “there’s no 
question to me that juveniles and adolescents, because their brains are not 
fully developed at this point, will make rash or irrational acts and actions that 
they themselves may not make once they’re 28, 29, 30 and their brains are 
more fully developed.”132 
Judges also explained how an appreciation of this research has led them 
to adapt their methods of handling juveniles in court.  Judge 24 explained 
that she has worked to simplify the court process for juveniles in her court 
because of the recognition that juveniles lack the ability to “reason through 
things and understand consequences long-range.”133  Specifically, she talked 
about how it influences standards she sets for juveniles that come into her 
court regarding probation and how she makes terms less stringent than she 
would for adults.  Although she talked about adjusting the court process 
based on her knowledge of adolescent development, it is worth noting that 
she did not mention adjusting her lens regarding competency; she ascribed 
competency related to adolescent development as being relevant to or 
involved in “the more serious crimes,” while within the juvenile court setting 
“we don’t see a lot of competency [issues].”134 
Finally, judges largely remained cognizant of the fact that criminal 
behavior of juveniles might be especially emotion-driven.  One judge 
described juveniles as being “more emotionally than pragmatically driven” 
and later expressed beliefs that juveniles’ “brain development is going to be 
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secondary to their emotional response to things, whether it’s other kids 
pressuring them, getting upset, reacting, not thinking it through. I just think 
it’s so intertwined . . . their brain is not as great a resource as it will be later 
on.”135  Instead of veering toward punishment, their enhanced understanding 
of juveniles’ developmental immaturity has led these judges to take an 
approach that is more focused on helping juveniles.  As Judge 25 put it, “We 
expect them to do stupid things.  It’s how you limit the potential 
consequences when you do those stupid things—that’s key.”136 
3. Lack of a Developed Value System 
Judges frequently referenced the character of juveniles when discussing 
the influence of adolescent development on behavior.  Character was 
described by judges as an individual’s morals, value systems, and how those 
morals and value systems influence actions.  Juvenile behavior was often 
discussed in terms of the societal impact; a juvenile’s immaturity is harmful 
not only to them, but their community as well.  Juveniles are less able to meet 
societal expectations, such as “empathy, the ability to see things from another 
person’s perspective or to understand the consequences in terms of how their 
conduct affects other people” because of their adolescent development.137 
However, judges regarded juveniles’ lack of developed value systems 
and poor character not as fixed but merely the result of juveniles’ 
developmental immaturity.  Judge 13 tied together the biological and social 
elements of this juvenile character development, saying, “I think of it as 
probably more heavily influenced environmentally than biologically, but it’s 
all part and parcel of the brain.”138 
C. JUDGES’ APPLICATION OF ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT TO 
JUVENILE COMPETENCY 
1. Judges Who Do Not Consider Adolescent Development Important 
to Competency 
Surprisingly, despite its influence on their understandings of juvenile 
behavior, adolescent development had a mixed influence on judges’ 
determinations of competency.  Although judges universally expressed 
beliefs in findings showing the lack of developmental and behavioral 
maturity in juveniles, sixteen out of twenty-seven (59.3%) said that 
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adolescent development and the immaturity gap bears no influence on their 
decisions on competency.  These judges viewed adolescent brain and psycho-
social development as disconnected from competency.  For example, Judge 
9 explained that “I don’t know that [information on adolescent development] 
helps me at all understand juvenile competency. In fact, I truthfully, when it 
comes to that research, I don’t think any of the research I would’ve seen 
would explain or help me understand juvenile competency any better.”139 
Judge 4 had previously spoken about his experiences of learning about 
research on adolescent development in prior judicial training and was able to 
explain the process of brain maturation over time.  Research does play a role 
in his consideration of juvenile behavior generally, as he stated, “We have to 
consider [research on adolescent development] . . . That’s one reason why 
they’re juveniles, because you assume that their brain hasn’t totally 
developed and they make rash decisions without thinking sometimes about 
different things. So yeah, you have to consider that.”140  Yet, when asked 
about the potential relationship between juvenile competency and adolescent 
development, he explained that “competency is different from brain 
development. . . . That’s a different issue altogether.”141  While he viewed 
brain development as influential to juvenile decision-making in offending, 
he did not consider adolescent development as relevant to determinations of 
juvenile competency; instead, he viewed impaired decision-making as an 
explanation of why a juvenile was in the courtroom in the first place.  This 
response particularly reflects the sentiments of the other fifteen judges who 
said that adolescent development bears no influence in their competency 
decisions.  Judge 26 similarly felt that: 
Brain development in and of itself doesn’t necessarily affect competency. There might 
be other things within the section of brain development, if you have intellectual—an 
intellectual disability, a brain injury, something like that. But I think that’s a little bit 
different than just, kind of, adolescent brain development. That I think, there’s a whole 
lot of differences to that kind of adolescent brain development.142 
Indeed, although overall judges indicated the importance of a juvenile’s 
“awareness,” meaning behavioral cues and a juvenile’s demeanor that 
demonstrate to a judge a juvenile’s competency,143 these judges did not 
appear to connect how a juvenile’s awareness in competency was relevant to 
adolescent development.  Instead, judges appeared to believe that adolescent 
development was only connected to criminal actions that result in a juvenile’s 
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presence in court, while competency focuses on awareness as it relates to 
mental capacity and understandings of the legal process.  For example, Judge 
20 explained that competency is about “whether or not right now, they’re 
mentally stable enough to communicate with their attorney to proceed the 
trial,” while “[adolescent development] research mostly deals—with just 
consequences and acting in the moment versus thinking about risk and 
actions have consequences and things like that.”144  Similarly, Judge 19, 
commenting that competency is a legal but not a psychological concept, 
stated that during competency evaluations, “you’re asking a psychologist 
to . . . help you make a determination using terminology that doesn’t mean 
anything from a psychological perspective.”145 
When asked about the possible connection between research and 
competency, some judges were surprised at the very idea that there could 
even be a tangible connection between the two.  Judge 13 expressed that it 
was entirely novel to him: “I’ve never thought of that, I’ve generally thought 
of them as, well—except for very young children, I tend to think of those as 
independent variables.”146  Judge 10 began to see training differently after 
being asked about a possible connection between competency and adolescent 
development.  He believed that more training should be given on competency 
within the context of adolescent development because the relationship was 
“an area that we all kind of are uncertain about and I never really thought of 
it as much—you’re making me think more as to how [competency] relates to 
the adolescent brain.”147 
2. Judges Who Consider Adolescent Development Important to 
Competency 
The eleven of the twenty-seven (40.7%) judges who drew a link 
between competency and adolescent development view brain development 
as having a “domino effect” on a juvenile’s competency-related abilities, 
meaning more competency-related abilities are accrued as the brain matures.  
These judges believe that juveniles, given their limited maturity, have limited 
understanding that should be taken into account in competency.  According 
to Judge 23: 
If their brain function is such that they can’t really control their behavior, at least don’t 
have the ability to appreciate what it is they’re doing, who it might affect and the 
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consequences, then I think you have to take that into account when you’re determining 
[competency] . . . So, I think it’s all part of a better, or bigger picture.148 
Adolescent development even makes some judges question the 
competency inquiry itself.  Judge 19 emphasized uncertainty “about whether 
competency is even an appropriate yardstick to apply in juvenile cases.”149 
Overall, there are two main dimensions along which adolescent 
development affects these eleven judges’ views on juvenile competency.  
First, research on adolescent development has played a notable role in the 
way that these judges analyze the behavior of juveniles and understand their 
motivations in the court process.150  Judges go into the courtroom setting with 
the knowledge and understanding that juveniles have poorer cognitive 
function skills, judgment and decision-making capabilities, and behave less 
rationally; as they work, judges try to make sense of the world from the 
viewpoint of juveniles and the decisions that they are making.151  They then 
use this understanding as an explanation of behavior, and this explanation 
then plays a role in how the judge will respond to them in competency-related 
matters.  Judge 7 explained her mental process: “How does a brain affect how 
one thinks and how one perceives their world and their environment, and how 
they evaluate what other people do, that’s all part of brain function. You put 
those kinds of perceptions together and that’s where kids’ behavior comes 
from.”152 
Second, knowledge on adolescent development has led judges to take 
different approaches when interacting with juveniles in the court setting; in 
particular, they are more likely to favor using their discretionary powers to 
tailor the court process to fit the individual child and account for their 
continuing development.  If judges are unable to effectively tailor the process 
around a juvenile’s deficits related to adolescent development, then 
competency is questioned.  This might involve cautioning attorneys on the 
social susceptibility of a juvenile or repeating consequences of legal 
decisions in order for juveniles to understand the full weight of such choices.  
As Judge 27 explained, “When the kid first comes into court, you know, we 
need to be figuring out how we are adjusting our language, how we’re 
adjusting our form, how we’re adjusting our conversation, you know, all of 
that we need to do in terms of what the research is saying.”153  Overall, 
understandings of adolescent development have changed the ways that these 
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judges view juvenile behavior and how juveniles might not understand the 
legal process.  Judge 2, a judge who worked as a juvenile judge for the 
entirety of his career, criticized others for not taking information about 
adolescent development into account in competency determinations: “I think 
the more we know about it, the better decisions we’ll be able to make. . . . I 
think that is inherently wrong for the child, it’s inherently wrong for society 
when you see how their brains develop.”154 
D. OPINIONS ON AGE OF COMPETENCY-RELATED ABILITIES 
Judges were asked their opinions regarding the age at which individuals 
gain certain features of competency: the ability to understand court 
proceedings, the ability to weigh the consequences of trial, and the ability to 
not be unduly influenced by authority figures, particularly one’s attorney.  
Additionally, judges were asked at what age they thought the brain fully 
develops.  Every judge who gave a response (twenty-five total) said that the 
brain developed at the age of twenty-four years old or later.  They relied 
heavily on their previous training and exposure to research as an explanation 
for their views (“from what I read and heard, the brain development reaches 
its sort of physical maturity at about age twenty-four”).155  A gap in 
adolescent and brain development between the sexes was believed to play a 
role as well, with judges believing that women’s brains mature faster than 
men’s, explaining the “bone-headed” behavior seen more often in boys.156 
Even though all responding judges believed that brain development 
finishes in an individual’s mid-twenties, most judges’ answers were much 
lower than that when asked about the age at which a youth acquires different 
competency-related abilities.  Over half of judges felt that a juvenile’s 
understanding court proceedings was not dependent on age alone and instead 
was dependent upon the individual child.  These judges indicated that they 
would not strike down competency automatically based on age, even for very 
young children.  Their answers tended to reflect their viewing competency 
on a case-by-case basis, regardless of age.  Ultimately, sixteen judges gave 
an answer that fell within the range of adolescence (thirteen to sixteen years 
old), with the rest indicating older ages. 
Sixteen judges viewed juveniles sixteen years of age and older as able 
to weigh the consequences of trial.  However, eleven responses were ages 
between twelve and fourteen years old.  Those who believed that only older 
youth, sixteen years of age or older, could handle these consequences 
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believed that younger children are largely unable to emotionally and 
cognitively process what a trial entails.  The ability to avoid being unduly 
influenced by authority figures, particularly attorneys, was seen to develop 
primarily once an individual is past eighteen years of age for about half the 
sample.  For these judges, this ability develops once an individual is able to 
“think for themselves.”  However, over half of judges believed that the ability 
to resist undue influence from authority figures, like other competency-
related abilities, should be determined more on a case-by-case basis; these 
were the judges who primarily answered below the age of eighteen for this 
prompt.  For example, Judge 12 felt that “there are some fifteen-year-olds 
that are really confident, then there’s thirty-year-olds who can’t stand up for 
themselves.”157 
Regardless of the age at which they believed the brain fully develops, 
judges’ answers and overall views on these questions indicated two 
perspectives regarding these competency-related skills.  On one side, some 
judges seemed to view these competency-related abilities as “building 
blocks” that, with additional information, might “check enough boxes” that 
a juvenile understands the legal process, the role of his attorney, and other 
consequences of trial enough to be determined competent.  These judges 
tended to view things on a “case-by-case basis.”158  Judge 8 listed “the 
learning of mental age” and “social development” as more informative of a 
child’s ability to handle trials, more so than age.  Judge 4 expressed 
confidence that youth can possess these abilities, saying that “you can have 
some young kids who know what an attorney is and know how to deal with 
the attorney and effectively communicate with an attorney. And then you got 
others that cannot. So, I think at a younger age, sometimes that’s possible.”159 
Interestingly, the large majority of judges discussing this “building blocks” 
model of competency were those that indicated that considering adolescent 
development is not important to them in competency determinations. 
On the other side, other judges, particularly those who tended to give 
higher ages to these questions, saw competency as requiring several different 
layers of understanding legal consequences and processes, many of which 
they argued are not possible in young kids.  Judges, moving away from the 
“building blocks” perspective, argued that all features related to competency-
related abilities need to be present to indicate juvenile competency.  Age 
played a larger role in their beliefs in competency generally, not on a case-
by-case basis.  Judge 21 felt that only those older than twenty-one years old 
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could understand court proceedings.  From his perspective, “If you say the 
word ‘fully’ and that’s the problem, because fully, younger people can, you 
know, in the system, they can utilize it, but they can’t ‘fully’ understand and 
‘fully’ utilize it.”160  The large majority of judges discussing this “holistic” 
model of competency were those that indicated that considering adolescent 
development is important to them in competency determinations. 
E. TRAINING ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHO-
SOCIAL MATURITY 
Judges reported that they gained their knowledge about adolescent 
development and developmental science from a variety of sources, the most 
common being local judicial trainings (seventeen judges or 63%).  Trainings 
were most often part of national or state conferences.  Six judges had attended 
seminars held during the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges conference.  The amount of time allotted for these trainings is often 
sparse; training sessions typically last between forty minutes and two and a 
half days.  In addition to conferences, many judges had attended seminars, 
usually at the county level for judges, attorneys, and other legal actors, held 
by mental health professionals on these issues, usually during a lunch in the 
courthouse (thirteen judges).  Judges had also received literature and 
pamphlets on these issues through conferences and seminars, some of which 
they refer back to often (thirteen judges).  When asked about the content of 
trainings, seminars, and other information judges had received on adolescent 
development as part of their judgeships, the overwhelming sentiment was 
that this information was about adolescent development as it relates to 
juvenile offending, not juvenile competency. 
A few judges also commented on learning about adolescent 
development from personal experience.  Six judges considered their having 
raised children as beneficial to their understandings of adolescent 
development.  For example, Judge 8 explained, “Some of my own experience 
both as a dad of two kids and going through that, as well as other children 
I’ve seen over the years, sort of reinforces what we’ve learned.”161  Judge 25 
viewed parenting as helpful in shaping his approach in the courtroom, saying, 
“I always felt that experience of putting yourself in the shoes of a parent and 
how you deal with this child, when in doubt, I usually go for that.”162  In these 
situations, parenting helped judges observe adolescent behavior within an 
everyday context; their experiences with children in the courtroom are easier 
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because of this, as they are familiar with this behavior and able to easily 
attribute it to developmental immaturity. 
In interviews, judges were asked to rate their knowledge of research on 
adolescent development.  Judges tended to rate their knowledge in terms of 
four categories: (1) a general rating of one’s knowledge, (2) knowledge as 
compared to judicial peers, (3) knowledge as compared to the general public, 
and (4) knowledge as compared to experts on the topic.  In response to the 
general rating of one’s knowledge, nineteen judges rated themselves as 
higher than six on a general scale from one to ten, showing a tendency to 
view themselves as very knowledgeable.  When comparing themselves to 
other judges, judges rated themselves highly with an average around 8, 
suggesting that they may view themselves as more aware of these issues than 
their colleagues.  In comparisons to the general public, the ratings were also 
high, with the lowest score being a seven and the highest a ten.  Comparisons 
to experts yielded the lowest ratings, with an average of one. 
These rankings reflect a pattern throughout the interviews, namely, that 
the judges expressed confidence in their knowledge.  Judge 19 stated that, “I 
would say I am more open to these concepts [than] most judges. . . . People 
can know things and they don’t influence how they try to do their work. I’m 
very influenced by this information.”163  Judge 25 referred to his faith in this 
research as his having “drank the Kool-Aid early on.”164  Despite expressing 
confidence in their knowledge, there was overwhelming support for 
receiving more information about adolescent development.  All except one 
judge held a strong belief that they would still benefit from additional 
training.  They expressed eagerness to be informed of changes in the field 
and new research findings.  As Judge 4 put it, “That’s why you have 
continuing education.  Because, you know, at the minimum you need to be 
refreshed on it, because you forget, and you need to understand, and you need 
to know, and research is always changing.”165  Judges were also specific 
about what they desire to learn.  They desire more scientific information 
about development, as well as guidance on how to treat juveniles effectively 
within the juvenile justice framework as related to development.  They also 
sought help in figuring out how to respond to and resolve cases in ways that 
are most beneficial to the juveniles and even how to adjust the juvenile 
system and their courtroom in response to this research. 
While judges indicated that they valued training for themselves, more 
emphasis was placed on ensuring that their colleagues were properly 
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educated about adolescent development.  Judges viewed some of their 
colleagues critically and in great need of training on these issues.  For 
example, Judge 25 described them as “pay[ing] lip service” to the idea of 
developmental science,166 while Judge 14 explained how some of the other 
judges “believe that we should come down on these kids like a ton of 
bricks.”167  Judge 10 explained the resistance in the judicial “field” to this 
new information: “It’s science and sometimes judges in the criminal justice 
systems come kicking and screaming into accepting what really is acceptable 
science.”168  Increased training was seen as a means through which their 
colleagues could become oriented towards seeing juveniles as these judges 
do. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Through these in-depth interviews with a sample of twenty-seven 
judges from across the U.S., we uncover a range of explanations regarding if 
and how juvenile judges consider adolescent development in determinations 
of juvenile competency.169  Although data show that research on and 
understandings of adolescent development do play a large role in shaping 
judges’ understandings of juvenile behavior, particularly related to emotional 
control, irrational behavior, lack of maturity, and social susceptibility,170 
most judges only connected these characteristics to the underlying reasons 
for offending behavior and not to juvenile competency.171 
This research does have a few limitations.  First, although twenty-seven 
interviewees for a qualitative interview study is large for research on 
judges,172 this research still only portrays the views of twenty-seven 
individuals.173  Second, our sample was from sixteen different states, yet was 
not nationally representative, and for most of the sixteen participating states, 
only one judge was interviewed from each state.174  Conversely, juvenile 
judges from the state of Georgia were overrepresented in this study.175  
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However, as mentioned above, the state in which judges served did not 
appear to have any connection with their views (e.g. Georgia judges did not 
appear to express any particular opinions more than other judges).176  That 
said, our data are not fully nationally representative,177 and we do not know 
how the views found in this sample may align with those of other juvenile 
judges across the country. 
Third, as discussed in other qualitative research on judges, our interview 
request may have resulted in a self-selected sample.178  Particularly, these 
judges may be individuals more likely to be interested in participating in a 
study on competency than other judges.  However, taking these limitations 
of the sample into account, representativeness is not the goal of qualitative 
research, and the data from our diverse range of juvenile judges did reach 
theoretical saturation regarding the themes presented above.179  Finally, we 
have discussed the views expressed by judges on adolescent development 
and juvenile competency,180 but we do not have data on how these views may 
actually impact juvenile competency determinations in practice. 
With these limitations in mind, this research produced four main 
takeaways.  First, juvenile judges reported considering the same types of 
factors when determining juvenile competency as those discussed in the 
existing literature on judicial views of juvenile competency.181  Although 
some judges were somewhat suspicious of competency evaluations and many 
considered them only one piece of the puzzle, opinions put forth in 
competency evaluations by psychologists or clinicians were described by 
judges as important to their determinations,182 which is similar to previous 
literature.183  A juvenile’s age, although described by many judges as 
considered on a case-by-case basis, was also considered impactful.184  
Particularly, similar to Cox et al. and Baerger et al., most judges believed that 
some very young children likely will not have the awareness to understand 
legal proceedings or aid their attorneys and therefore may not possess 
competency-related abilities.185  Finally, evidence of a psychiatric diagnosis 
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or issues with mental capacity has also been known to influence juvenile 
judges’ competency determinations.186  Our data corroborated the importance 
of mental capacity in judges’ determinations of juvenile competency.187 
Second, our research suggests that juvenile judges are very aware of 
psychological and neurological research on adolescent development and the 
corresponding immaturity gap between adults and juveniles.188  They 
repeated commonly accepted research on these issues and even knew the 
names of particular brain regions related to adolescent development, such as 
the prefrontal cortex and limbic region.189 
Judges also appear to be very influenced by their understandings of 
adolescent development when thinking about their own responses to juvenile 
offending, with the majority believing that it should guide their decisions on 
how to address juvenile behavior in court.190  These views appeared to be at 
least in some way influenced by judicial trainings or seminars on adolescent 
development related to juvenile offending that the large majority of judges in 
this sample have previously taken.191  Indeed, judges highlighted that they 
had found the information in these previous learning opportunities helpful, 
interesting, and imperative in their rulings and in those of their colleagues.192 
Overall, judges’ sentiments on adolescent development and its effect on 
juvenile behavior, particularly offending, mirror the historical philosophy of 
the juvenile justice system: that age and inexperience make juveniles less 
culpable for their actions compared to adults and more likely to be 
rehabilitated.193 
Third, although very aware of research on adolescent development and 
cognizant of the effects it may have on juvenile behaviors related to 
emotionality, social susceptibility, risks, and judgment,194 juvenile judges 
were divided on whether adolescent development is important (or 
unimportant) to determining juvenile competency, with the majority 
conveying that they saw no real relationship between the two and do not 
consider it.195  This division supports the limited quantitative research that 
shows conflicting results on whether judges believe adolescent development 
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and psycho-social maturity is significant to consider in juvenile competency 
considerations, 196 and this research provides much needed qualitative data 
that suggests many judges see these concepts as separate, unrelated issues. 
Those judges who do consider adolescent development important to 
competency determinations recognize that juveniles have poorer cognitive 
function skills, behave less rationally, and should be treated differently than 
adults during court proceedings.197  Particularly, these psycho-social deficits 
signal to judges to take different approaches when interacting with juveniles 
in the court setting, using their discretionary powers with caution and 
working to tailor the court process to the developmental status of the juvenile 
in order to make sure they are understanding the legal process.198 
On the other hand, it was surprising that sixteen judges saw no 
connection between adolescent development and juvenile competency,199 as 
the literature provides evidence that the same behaviors and tendencies 
associated with the juvenile immaturity gap also have implications for 
juvenile competency.200  Particularly, juvenile judges recognized how 
psycho-social deficits associated with adolescent development can affect a 
juvenile’s judgment and decision-making,201 which are known to 
significantly influence competency-related abilities, such as a juvenile’s 
ability to understand future consequences and the weight of his decisions in 
court.202  Yet most did not recognize these deficits as potentially causing 
problems for juvenile competency.203  Judges identified key differences 
between juveniles and adults in their cognitive abilities,204 but these judges 
generally did not recognize how these differences could affect behaviors 
related to trial, such as understanding and processing legal proceedings.205  
Additionally, although acknowledging that juveniles are significantly more 
socially susceptible than adults,206 the majority of participants did not discuss 
or understand how this susceptibility to peer or authority pressure might 
cause a juvenile to be unduly influenced by others, such as his lawyer and 
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the judge.207  Judges also accepted the immaturity gap between juveniles and 
adults208 but did not recognize how this immaturity may impair competency-
related abilities, such as understanding what it means to waive legal rights, 
take pleas, or the meaning of legal jargon, legal process, and the charges 
mounted against them.209 
Further, the dissimilar ways in which judges understood age as related 
to competency and adolescent development were particularly interesting and 
illuminating.210  Literature indicates that both younger and older adolescents 
have a demonstrated lack of knowledge regarding trials and legal concepts, 
as well as the inability to weigh long-term consequences.211  Yet many judges 
felt that a juvenile’s competency is not necessarily dependent on age or 
developmental status but should be determined on a case-by-case basis.212  
These judges said they would not find a juvenile incompetent automatically 
based on age or any one factor, even for very young children.213 
Indeed, although indicating that brain development does not stop until 
the mid-twenties, the large majority of judges that indicated that adolescent 
development is not important to them in competency determinations appear 
to view individual competency-related abilities, such as the ability to 
understand court proceedings, weigh the consequences of trial, and not be 
unduly influenced by authority figures, as “building blocks” that might build 
a case for the judge that a juvenile is competent to stand trial, regardless of 
age.214 
The ways in which these judges discussed competency allude to the 
“competency screening” measures that gauge juveniles’ abilities to 
“understand,” “reason,” and “appreciate” in different categories and ways in 
order to determine whether a juvenile is competent, regardless of age.215  
However, the MacCAT-CA, which uses these three subcategories to measure 
the cognitive aspects of competency, has been found to be inconsistent in its 
ability to effectively measure competency across all ages.216  This may 
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suggest that this “building blocks” model may not be an effective method in 
determining competency, as just “checking boxes” to build a case for 
competency can leave out other important competency-related abilities and 
indicators, such as age and developmental status, that are not measured by 
this method. 
Fourth, the fact that many judges do not consider adolescent 
development as relevant to competency determinations,217 yet still indicate 
that adolescents exhibit attributes due to adolescent development that 
diminish competency-related abilities,218 appears to show a cognitive 
disconnect.  We argue that a likely reason that this disconnect exists for over 
half the judges in this study might be because judges have not yet been taught 
to think about competency as a psychologically- or developmentally-related 
concept, and instead, have been only taught to think of offending as a concept 
related to these issues.  To highlight, several judges stated that “competency 
is different from brain development”219 and “brain development in and of 
itself doesn’t necessarily affect competency.”220  “You’re asking a 
psychologist to . . . help you make a determination using terminology that 
doesn’t mean anything from a psychological perspective,”221 said one judge.  
For these judges, competency is about “whether or not right now, they’re 
mentally stable enough to communicate with their attorney to proceed to 
trial,” while “[adolescent development] research mostly deals . . . with just 
consequences and acting in the moment versus thinking about risk and 
actions have consequences . . . .”222 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our results suggest that many judicial determinations of competency do 
not actively and effectively take psycho-social maturity into account,223 
which may result in unfair and inequitable outcomes for juveniles.224  
Particularly, the ways in which many juvenile judges currently think about 
competency as a sort of “building blocks” process in which age and 
developmental status may not play a key or vital role could lead some 
juveniles who lack key competency-related abilities to be found 
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competent.225  In order for juveniles to be adjudicated in a “developmentally 
appropriate way,”226 judges must be educated on the potential downfalls of 
using the “building blocks” model of juvenile competency and the role of 
adolescent development in shaping competency-related abilities. 
The data provided in this study may help to design more tailored and 
effective educational programs for judges on these issues.227  Judges appear 
to heavily rely on trainings for making explicit connections between research 
and how to deal with juveniles in court.228  Unless the training makes those 
direct connections, many judges appear not to be able to abstractly apply the 
general principles and findings related to adolescent development to other 
areas of juvenile justice, including competency, that are not related to 
offending.229  Nonetheless, even in discussing these issues with judges who 
do not currently consider adolescent development as important to their 
competency determinations, many began to see these issues differently after 
being asked about a possible connection—“you’re making me think more as 
to how it [competency] relates to the adolescent brain,”230 as one judge stated.  
Thus, these results indicate that by making stronger and obvious ties to 
competency in trainings, seminars, and other judicial education materials, it 
is very possible that more direct education and training of judges on the role 
of adolescent development in competency-related abilities may be helpful. 
Judges largely appear to be supportive of a return to the rehabilitative 
goals of the juvenile justice system, and treating juveniles fairly and 
providing effective services to them is a responsibility that falls within the 
domain of the juvenile judge.231  By providing direct education to judges on 
these issues, we can potentially adjust training to help judges appreciate how 
understanding competency in these ways can help maximize rehabilitative, 
effective, and equitable outcomes for juvenile offenders.232  As juvenile 
judges have been thought to have the most impact on setting the tone and 
philosophy of the juvenile justice system,233 we must shape their minds on 
these issues before seeing more systemic effects in the juvenile justice 
system. 
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Further, this research can help to revise existing competency measures, 
such as the MacCAT-CA, and assist states that are considering developing or 
modifying juvenile competency statutes.234  The Dusky standard is thought to 
be an incomplete model of competency for juveniles, particularly leaving out 
the potential consideration of developmental immaturity or even age.235  The 
few states that have added statutory additions to competency standards 
related to adolescent development have given juvenile judges no real 
guidelines on how to consider developmental factors in competency 
determinations.236  This study’s findings can help identify blind spots of 
judges on these issues and craft statutory guidelines on how judges should 
analyze and consider developmental factors.  In recognition of the limitations 
and pitfalls of thinking about juvenile competency from a “building blocks” 
perspective, competency screening measures can also be amended, taking 
judicial behavior and certain developmental factors into account based on 
this data. 
Ultimately, this study highlights many areas for future research.  
Research designs that involve experimental components, in addition to 
qualitative ones, may be able to provide methodological triangulation on 
these issues, as well as provide important information on how judges’ views 
expressed here may practically affect judges’ decision-making processes in 
juvenile competency determinations.  Further, future research should directly 
examine the influence of judicial training and different levels of judges’ 
knowledge on adolescent development in relation to their views on 
competency and competency-related abilities.  As this sample included 
judges who described themselves as knowledgeable on these issues,237 it 
would be interesting to discuss these issues with judges who have not had 
training or exposure to information on adolescent development.  As an 
experiment, it might be interesting to do a survey or interview on these issues 
before and after the training of judges who have recently rotated into juvenile 
court for the first time in states that have rotating judicial assignments.  
Finally, as this research discusses the role and importance of competency 
evaluations by clinicians and psychologists, future inquiries may aim to 
survey those individuals on how they would want judges to incorporate the 
information they provide into juvenile competency determinations and in 
what ways they think adolescent development affects competency-related 
abilities. 
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